This paper presents evidence that incorporating costly thought, modelled with rational inattention, might solves three well-established puzzles in the retirement literature. The first puzzle is that, given incentives, the extent of bunching of labour market exits at legislated state pension ages (SPA) seems incompatible with rational expectations (e.g. Cribb, Emmerson, and Tetlow, 2016) . Adding to the evidence for this puzzle, this paper includes an empirical analysis focusing on whether liquidity constraints can account for this bunching and find they cannot. The nature of this puzzle is clarified by exploring a life-cycle model with rational agents that does match aggregate profiles. This model succeeds in matching these aggregates only by overestimating the impact of the SPA on poorer individuals whilst underestimating its impact on wealthier people. The second puzzle is that people are often mistaken about their own pension provisions (e.g. Gustman and Steinmeier, 2001) . Concerning this second puzzle, I incorporate rational inattention to the SPA into the aforementioned life-cycle model, thus allowing for mistaken beliefs. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first not only to incorporate rational inattention into a life-cycle model but also to assess a rationally inattentive model against non-experimental individual choice data. This facilitates another important contribution to the rational attention literature: discipling the cost of attention with subjective expectations data. Preliminary results indicate rational inattention can not only improve the aggregate fit to the data but better matches the response of participation to the SPA across the wealth distribution, hence offering a resolution to the first puzzle. The third puzzle is that despite more than actuarially fair options to defer receipt of pension benefits in some countries, take up is extremely low (e.g. Shoven and Slavov, 2014) . A simple extension of the main model generates, by extending the source of uncertainty and including a claiming decision, an explanation of this last puzzle: the actuarial calculations implying deferral being preferable ignore the utility cost of paying attention to your pension which can be avoided by claiming. This paper researches these puzzles in the context of the ongoing reform to the UK female state pension age.
Introduction
This paper explores the rationality of retirement decisions and whether allowing for the costly nature of thought explains observed regularities better than the status quo which abstract away from these costs. In particular, it focus on three puzzles for a rational expectations (RE) explanation of retirement choices. Firstly, that it is difficult to reconcile the large number of labour market exits at legislated pension entitlement ages with RE.
Secondly, that individuals are frequently mistaken about their own retirement provisions. Thirdly, despite more than actuarially fair pension deferral incentives, deferral rates are very low. I find that acknowledging costly thought accommodates the second puzzle whilst generating mechanisms that helps explain the first and third.
Ageing populations have forced many governments to increase the state pension age. These reforms revealed the first puzzle: labour market exits are more sensitive to legislated state pension ages than RE can accommodate given the limited incentives to retire exactly at these ages (Behaghel, and Blau, 2012; Tetlow, 2016; Seibold, 2017; Lalive, Magesan and Staubli, 2017) . This paper contributes to the evidence for this puzzle, within the context of the ongoing reform to the UK female state pension age (SPA), by studying the dependence of the response to the SPA on asset holdings. I find an indistinguishable participation response to the SPA across the wealth distribution largely ruling out liquidity constraints as a RE consistent explanation of this puzzle.
This claimed oversensitivity is in tension with studies that successfully match observed retirement decisions without abandoning RE (French, 2005; French and Jones, 2011 ; O'Dea, 2018), although these are not studies of a pension reform. One contribution of this paper is to offer a resolution of this tension. This is achieved by investigating whether a RE model that successfully matches aggregate labour market profiles around SPA also matches the response to changes in the SPA across the wealth distribution. The model succeeds in matching the aggregates only by exaggerating the response to the SPA amongst the bottom half of the wealth distribution whilst shrinking the response amongst the top half.
The second puzzling regularity at odds with RE is that individuals are frequently mistaken about their pension provision (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2001 ; Rohwedder and Kleinjans, 2006; Crawford and Tetlow, 2010;  Amin-Smith and Crawford, 2018). Traditionally life-cycle models treat institutional factors like the SPA as static parameters known, without cost, by everyone; an approach which precludes any explanation of why people are systematically mistaken. By acknowledging the stochasticity of government pension policy and incorporating costly thought, this paper attempts to explain this observed ignorance. Costly thought is modelled using rational inattention (RI), an approach that includes a utility cost of information acquisition.
Allowing for these incorrect beliefs explains the bunching of labour market exits with greater success than the RE benchmark model. The mechanism behind this result is as follows: rational inattention to the SPA introduces additional uncertainty implying greater precautionary saving which leads to greater labour market participation. As this uncertainty is resolved upon reaching SPA, this induces bunching of labour market exit at the SPA. This mechanism is not strictly dependent on rational inattention and exist with the introduction of a stochastic SPA alone. However, for reasonable levels of stochasticity that match how the government has historically reformed the SPA, I find that the amplification of uncertainty inherent in rational inattention is required to produce a discernible difference from the RE benchmark.
The third puzzle for a RE explanation of retirement behaviour is that despite clear incentives to defer in both the UK and USA, deferral is very uncommon in both countries (Shoven and Slavov, 2012; Shoven and Slavov, 2014 ; Crawford and Tetlow, 2010) . The calculation implying than deferral is more than actuarially fair do not, however, take account of the attention cost of tracking pension entitlements. Once we allow for costly attention claiming immediately can be optimal as claiming removes one demand on our limited attention: tracking pension entitlements. I present an extension to my main model with that includes a mechanism capable of generating such results.
The reform to the UK female SPA provides me with the opportunity to investigate these question. This reform has a staggered implementation which creates individual level variation in SPAs allowing the effect of the SPA on employment to be identified separately from effects of ageing. Additionally, the UK institutional context has two features advantageous to identifying motivations behind retirement decisions. Firstly, receipt of the UK state pension is not conditional on employment status and only provides an incentive to retire for liquidity constrained individuals. Secondly, forcing someone to retire purely due to age is illegal, ruling out firm mandated retirement as an explanation for the bunching of labour market exits. The dataset I will use is the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) which is a detailed panel survey of older individual.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I review the literature and, in section 3, I outline the institutional context and the data used. In section 4, I present evidence of the three puzzles in my dataset focusing on the first puzzle that bunching of labour market exits at SPA cannot be explained with RE.
In particular, as liquidity constraints are the main explanation proposed within an RE approach, I investigate whether liquidity constraints can explain this bunching and find indications they cannot. To see if some RE compatible mechanism might explain the bunching, in section 5, I take a version of a recent rich structural model (O'Dea, 2018) that matches aggregate profile and investigates its mechanisms. I find that it matches the aggregate bunching of labour market exits at SPA only by exaggerating the response of those nearer the borrowing constraints and underestimating the response of those much further from it. This model then serves as a baseline into which I incorporate rational inattention in section 6. This rational inattention to the SPA mechanically explains the second puzzle but in section 5 I present preliminary result from a calibrated version of the model that the introduction of RI better approximates the response to the SPA across the distribution thus offering a explanation of the first puzzle. In section 7 I present an extension that increases the source of uncertainty that demand agents attention and introduces a claiming decision and argue that this generates a mechanism that can help explain the third puzzle. Section 8 concludes.
Literature Review
This paper contributes to the literatures identifying the three puzzles mentioned earlier by proposing a solution to them. This solution brings together two disparate literatures, on rational inattention and on quantitative retirement models, hence additionally making a contribution to each of these. In bringing these two literatures together this paper is the first work, to the best of the author's knowledge, to apply rational inattention to non-experimental individual choice data. This work can also be more broadly construed as part of the growing literatures on behavioural public economics or the economic implications of attention.
The first puzzle is that labour market participation appears more sensitive to SPA than Rational Expectations (RE) predicts given the incentives. It has long been known that labour force participation responds strongly to the eligibility ages of social security programs. Gruber and Wise (2004) survey evidence from 11 developed countries and find labour force exits concentrated around legislated retirement ages. The response of labour market participation to reforms in the social security eligibility ages has been widely studied (Staubli and Zweimuller, 2013; Manoli and Weber, 2012; Atalay and Barrett, 2015) . Often this literature has focused on estimating elasticities and fiscal impacts; however, recently a group of studies has argued that RE is unable to match the magnitude of labour market exits at legislated pension ages which is the principal puzzle this paper attempts to explain (Behaghel, age (FRA), the age they can claim their full pension, and introduced an Early Retirement Age (ERA), the earliest eligibility age to a reduced pension. They find, whilst incentives encourage most women to claim early, most delay. Seibold (2017) studies retirement in Germany where there exists an ERA, a FRA, and a NRA (normal retirement ages, a purely nominal age), along with multiple pathways into retirement; this arrangement creates over 600 kinks and notches in life-time budget constraints. These non-differentiabilities can be classified into statutory retirement ages where some expectation of retirement exists (i.e. ERA, FRA and NRA) and pure financial incentives. Siebold (2017) documents that the bunching of labour market exits is higher at the non-differentiability associated with a statutory retirement age rather than those only associated with a financial incentive and interprets this as evidence for reference dependent preference. Both Seibold (2017) and Lalive et al. (2017) present structural model that attempt to explain these findings. Cribb et al. (2016) study the same increase to the UK female SPA as this paper. Since the UK state pension age is the earliest that the pension can be claimed it is an ERA for international comparison. They produce reduced form estimates of the impact of reaching ERA on labour force participation and, although their paper is purely empirical, argue that their findings are difficult to explain with RE. As I borrow from and build on the methodology of Cribb et al. (2016) their methods are discussed in more detail in section 4.
The second puzzle, that people hold mistaken beliefs about their own pension provision, goes back to at least Gustman and Steinmeier (2001) . They compare reported expected benefits to objective calculations based on social security records and employer provided pension description and find misinformation the norm. Rohwedder and Kleinjans (2006) study the dynamics of these mistaken beliefs and find that their expectations become increasingly accurate as individuals approach retirement. Finally, Crawford and Tetlow (2010) look at women subject to the UK female SPA reform and find they hold substantially incorrect beliefs about their own SPA and Amin-Smith and Crawford (2018) update this analysis finding broadly similar results. An advantage of the structural model presented here over those of Seibold (2017) and Lalive et al. (2017) is that it accommodates both the fact people hold incorrect beliefs and that labour market exits bunch at SPA. I also rely on a different mechanism, rational inattention to the SPA, rather than reference dependent preferences (Seibold, 2018) or controlling the proportion of agents being unable to choose when to retire (Lalive et al., 2017) .
The literature on the third puzzle is, to the best of my knowledge, more recent. This is because what constitutes an actuarially favourable pension deferral is dependent on mortality probabilities and interest rates.
Shoven and Slavov (2014) look at the US and find that although whether deferral was beneficial or not in the 1960s was dependent on family status, by the 21st century deferral was preferable for nearly all the groups considered.
This change can be attributed to increased life-expectancy and historically low interest rates. Shoven and Slavov (2012) extend this analysis to look at optimal deferral choices for individuals allowing for heterogeneous survival probabilities and find that most households -even those with mortality rates that are twice the average -benefit from some delay. Despite these strong incentives to defer, these paper find in the US most individuals appear to claim Social Security soon after they reach the eligibility threshold age. This same puzzle has been observed in the UK context that I study. Crawford and Tetlow (2010) find that only ≈2% take up this option to defer receipt of the state pension, despite it being more than actuarially fair.
Addressing these puzzles this paper brings together two disparate literatures, one being on rational inattention (RI). RI was developed by Sims in a series of paper (1998; 2003; 2006) The second literature this paper makes a sustainable contribution to is that on quantitative retirement models. Early work in this literature, such as Gustman and Steinmeier (1986) and Burtless (1986) , abstracted away from uncertainty and borrowing constraint but more recent work take these into account. French (2005) estimate a model that allows for dynamics, health transitions and fixed costs of work to explain the retirement phenomena and French and Jones (2011) allow for medicare cost and greater individual heterogeneity. The paper from this literature most closely related to the current one is O'Dea (2018) who estimates a structural retirement model in the UK context to investigate the differing pension provision policies. As well as contributing to this literature by integrating new modelling techniques from RI, this paper is also contribute to this literature by comparing the predictions of these model to the ex-post data from a pension age reform.
More broadly this paper fits into the behavioural public economics literature and the growing literature on attention. This paper speak to the call in Gabaix (2019) for more structural estimation in the attention literature.
Data and Institutional Context
The context for this research project is the UK reform to the female state pension age (SPA). The Pensions An advantage of studying the UK reform is that UK law prohibits firms compulsorily retiring people based on age, so this cannot explain the bunching of labour market exits at SPA. Another advantage of the UK context is the state pension is not conditional on employment status and does not provide major tax incentive to exit from the labour market at this age (Cribb et al., 2016) . Together this removes financial incentives to retire at the SPA for all but the liquidity constrained. A disadvantage with the UK reform is the UK has a single retirement age at which pension benefits are claimed. This makes it difficult to rule out liquidity constraints driving the bunching of retirement at SPA, as the ability to borrow against future pension benefits is severely limited. Cribb et al. (2016) argue against credit constraints being the primary driver on the basis that, whilst 
Reduced Form Evidence
In this section I present reduced form evidence motivating the structural model. In section 4.1 I present reduced form evidence on the first puzzle. Section 4.1 is detailed as I contribute to the literature establishing the existence of a puzzle by focusing the analysis on the ability of liquidity constraints to explain away this puzzle in the UK context and find this explanation fall short. In section 4.2, I present some evidence for puzzles two and three. 
First Puzzle
The reduced form analysis presented in this section builds on Cribb et al. (2016) study the impact of the UK female SPA reform on labour market participation. They regress probability of participation (y it ) on: an indicator of being below the SPA; a full set of age, and year of birth dummies; and a vector of controls leading to the following specification:
They interpret the parameter α as a difference-in-difference estimator of the effect of the treatment of being below the SPA and find a statistically significant increase in the probability of being employed from the treatment. They estimate this equation as both a linear probability model and as a probit model with error clustered at the level of the individual. As mentioned, they argue that liquidity constraints cannot explain the treatment effect α because a similar size effect is observed for home-owners and renters. Here I repeat their analysis using ELSA which allows me to more control carefully for assets.
I first present results of estimating equation 1 as a random effect linear probability model with errors clustered at the level of the individual. I use a random effect specification because the small sample size means controlling for both autocorrelation and heteroskedascitiy by clustering and arbitrary fixed effect leads to imprecise estimates. The random effects assumption was tested with a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test on the treatment effect and the null, of no difference between the random effect and fixed effects coefficients, was not rejected. For those uncomfortable with the random effects assumption I also repeat and present all regression as fixed effects regression with clustered standard errors. Finally, as linear probability models have many well know flaws, I repeat the analysis presented here with a random effects probit specification model with clustered standard errors. The full list of controls used is: a full set of marriage status, years of eduction, education qualifications, and self reported health dummies; partners age; partners age squared; the aggregate unemployment rate during the quarter of interview; dummies for partner eligible for SPA, and for being one and two years above and below SPA; and assets of household according to one of the two specification discussed below.
Obviously, the households whose retirement decisions are least likely to be affected by liquidity constraints are those with substantial liquidity assets. I consider two categories of assets which are the two most liquid categories in Carrol and Samwick (1996) . Firstly, I look at very liquid assets (VLA) which cover any assets that could be liquidated almost immediately. This includes bank account balances, money market funds, certificates of deposit, government savings bonds, mutual funds, and publicly traded stocks. Secondly, I consider nonhousing, non-business wealth (NHNBW) which consist of VLA + all other assets and liabilities not related to the primary residence or personally owned businesses; these have in common that the household could liquidate rigorously test whether there is a significant difference between the treatment effects of the two groups by adding an interaction term to equation 1 and testing its coefficients. As can be seen, there is no significant difference at any reasonable level. These results contrasts with the predictions of a liquidity constraint explanation for the bunching of labour market exits at SPA.
However, we cannot tell a priori how far up the wealth distribution liquidity constraints affect choices.
For this reason, I construct three additional classifications of whether an individual is liquidity constrained each addressing this issue in distinction ways. The first classification considers an individual to be liquidity constrained if they are from a household without assets greater or equivalent to the total of their wage from their interview until their SPA. This classification, however, takes no account of exogenous risk or precautionary saving. The second classification takes account of the precautionary saving motive. It classifies an individual as liquidity constrained if their household has insufficient assets to cover their wage plus the level of asset decumulation at the bottom 25th percentile of the distribution of changes in asset between the periods covering their SPA. The idea behind this classification is that this amount of asset decumulation represent a measure of the exogenous risk a household faces at this point in their life-cycle. However, as both of these classifications select on wages when labour force participation is the dependent variable, they produce biased estimates. As people without a job before SPA are less likely to be excluded, the estimates are biased downwards. As I still find a significant treatment effect despite this bias, it is not as large an issue as it would first seem. I still, however, consider a third classification which does not select on wages: having sufficient assets to cover decumulation at the bottom 15th percentile of the distribution of changes in asset between the periods covering their SPA. Rows 4-9 of table   1 show the results of regressing equation 1 excluding liquidity constrained individuals; each row corresponds to a different combination of classifications and asset categories. As can been seen all treatment effects are positive and significant at the 5% level bar one which is significant at 10% level. The magnitudes are also little changed between subpopulation giving little indication that liquidity constraints even form part of the explanation of the observed effect of the SPA on labour force participation.
In rows 3 and 4 of table 2, I test the difference between the whole population and those classed as liquidity constrained according to classification 3 above. There is no statistically significant difference for either grouping.
I do not test the difference in treatment effect for the first two classification of liquidity constrained individuals because as mentioned selecting based on these two classification introduces selection bias and so the difference is not interpretable. The final two rows test the significance of a continuous interaction term for the two asset categorisations. For both of them the interaction term is negative and significant indicating that having more assets decrease the impact of being below SPA on the probability of being in work. However, the magnitude of the effect is tiny implying only a 50% reduction of the treatment effect to ≈ 5% for someone at the 99th percentile of the wealth distribution according to NHNBW assets. With this tiny change in the treatment effect due to increased assets it is hard to argue that the treatment effect is completely explained by liquidity constraints. Table 3 and 4 replicate tables 1 and 2 for the fixed effects specification. As can be seen in table 3, the treatment effects are now significant at the 5% level in four of the populations, at the 10% level in another two and insignificant in two populations. As the magnitudes of the point estimator are little changed, this lack of significance seems to be mostly driven by a lack of power. This is supported by table 4 where the difference between the treatment effects in the two subpopulations remains insignificant. Moreover, the impact of assets on the treatment effect is still tiny. average marginal effect at the median of the subpopulations wealth distribution and quotes the p values of this marginal effect; the coefficients themselves are always significant at the same level as their corresponding marginal effect. As 6 is intended to test the difference of the treatments the p values of the coefficients are quoted. The results are largely comparable to the random effect model both in terms of significance level and in terms of the magnitude of the effect.
As it points towards liquidity constraint not being the casual mechanism, I will take the approximate invariance of this treatment effect to restriction based on a median asset split as the stylised fact representing the first puzzle. The model contains 4 types, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, differentiated by high or low education and having access or not to a direct benefit (DB) pension scheme. Agents are rational expected utility maximisers who choose how much to consume c t , how much to invest in a risk-less asset a t with return r, and whether to work, dependent on not being involuntarily unemployed. The agent, conditional on not receiving a negative unemployment shock u t = 1, receives a stochastic income offer y t each period. Unemployment status is considered verifiable so that only if u t = 1 can the agent claim benefit b. If the agent is not unemployed, u t = 0, she receives a stochastic income offer y t and accepting the offer gives them an income of y t and leisure time of l t = 1 − w h . Her partner is modelled deterministically and earns a fixed amount spouseInc each period until he reaches 65, after which time he retires and earns the state pension p. The agent receives the same state pension, p, as her partner once she reaches the SP A which is a parameter that is varied to mimic the UK reform. However, unlike the partner she does not automatically retire and she receive this transfer whether she works or not. Types that have access to a defined benefit pension can claim this at age 65 conditional on leaving work. The value of the defined benefit pension is a function of average life time earning AIM E t . From age 60 the agent is exposed to a stochastic survival probability s t . Finally, agents value bequest through a warm glow bequest function (De Nardi, 2004; French, 2005) .
Second and Third Puzzles
Since the impact of the state pension on retirement decisions is the focus of this working paper, it is worth interrupting outlining the rest of the model to explain why I model the state pension as I do. Modelling the state pension as a fixed transfer p upon reaching the SPA is incorrect in two regards: individuals can choose to delay receipt of the state pension and the state pension does have components that are dependent both directly and indirectly on life-time earnings. The first issue is addressed in an extension in section 7 but it left out here as the objective in this section is to investigate the ability of RE to accommodate the first puzzle. However, the third puzzle, that despite more the actuarially fair deferral option only ≈2% take up the option, means that including a deferral option would introduce another puzzle RE has trouble explaining. Hence, to give the baseline RE model the best chance of explaining the first puzzle deferral is ignored here, but is discussed in an extension in section 7. The lump sum transfer modelling of the state pension carried out here does capture the essence of the basic state pension which is a fixed transfer. However, the basic state pension is reduced by a proportional amount if individuals do not meet the minimum number of years of national insurance contributions.
Additionally, the state second pension is directly based on earnings. Further complications arise as individuals now claiming the state pension have entitlements that were accrued under different systems, such as SERPS, producing complex and abstruse rules (Bozio, Crawford, and Tetlow, 2010 provide a detailed history). In future versions of this working paper I intend to deal with these complexities by following O'Dea (2018) and modelling the state pension as a function of AIM E t which I will estimate outside the model. However, I do not believe that this current oversimplification has significant implications for qualitative predictions of this model as the magnitude of transfers would not be greatly affected.
So the model can be summarised as the agent solving the following problem to find policy functions for consumption c t (a t , y t , AIM E t ), leisure l t (a t , y t , AIM E t ), and assets a t+1 (a t , y t , AIM E t ):
where u(c t , l t ) = (c ν t l
Average earning evolving according to:
The defined benefit pension has the functional form:
The log income offer, y t , is the sum of a deterministic component, quadratic in age and specific to the agent's type, and a stochastic component:
where t follows an AR1 with normal error term and an initial distribution 1 ∼ N (0, σ 2 ).
The income offer can be conceptualised as being equal to some underlying productivity which the agent maintains during unemployment spells. The unemployment status of the agent u t evolves according to a conditional markov process, where the probability of unemployment is dependent on current productivity y t and the type of the agent.
The model starts with agents aged 52. The reasons to start agents so far into the life-cylce are, firstly, the ELSA dataset only starts interviewing people over 50 and, secondly, the period I am interested in is around retirement and so modelling early life-cylce behaviour would be computationally wasteful. The reason to start at 52 rather than 50 is that this is the youngest age with interviews from a large number of people some with SPA equal to 60 and some with an SPA strictly greater than 60. The agents start life with a draw from the empirical distribution of assets at age 52. To make sure the endogeneity of the SPA to the quantity of assets chosen by age 52 does not bias the model I used a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to test the null that assets conditional on distinct SPAs are drawn from the same distribution and found that the data do not reject this null. If the age 105 is reached the agent dies with certainty. From age 80 the agent no longer has the choice of working; this is to model some of the limitation imposed by declining health.
As described, the type of the agent introduces heterogeneity into whether the agent receives a DB pension, the earning process, and the probability of unemployment, but I do not allow for preference heterogeneity over The moments used to find the parameters are the proportion of women working between 52 and 75 and the level of household non-housing, non-business wealth (NHNBW) between the same ages. These moments are used to find the preference parameters γ, ν, β, and θ as well as the parameters of the defined benefit pension function db 1 , and db 2 . Solving for the DB pension parameters within the model is an unsatisfactory intermediate solution which will be corrected in future version when data access has been granted. A subsample of ELSA has been linked to administrative UK National Insurance data allowing a panel of earnings in each year of working life to be obtained for the respondent. With this data I can estimate AIM E t and so estimate db 1 and db 2 outside of the model. Figures 3 and 4 show the match of the participation and asset profile which are acceptably close given the coarseness with which the model is currently estimated (for example 30 grid points for assets). Table 7 contains the parameter estimates. Given the qualifications mentioned above, I only give to these number to show they are not wildly different from estimates in the literature and I have not yet calculated standard errors.
These profiles were estimated with SP A = 60 and against the moments of the pre-reform data. Once the parameters were estimated, I re-ran the model to generate simulated data with SP A = 60, SP A = 61, and SP A = 62 and re-ran the regression analysis from section 4 on this data. As can be seen in table 8 a significant treatment effect of being below the SPA is observed for the whole sample but unlike the real world data this treatment effect falls by half when we restrict to people with sufficient assets. So this rational expectation model matches the aggregate profile but fails to match the impact of the SPA on labour force participation across the distribution: exaggerating the effect on the poor and under predicting the effect on the wealthy. In the next section I attempt to ameliorate this issue by introducing rational inattention to the SPA.
Rational Inattentive Model
In this section I consider the implications that costly thought has for this retirement decision. First in subsection 6.1, I describe rational inattention and how I incorporate it into the model presented in section 5 and in subsection 6.2, I solve and analyse the model.
Incorporating Incorrect Beliefs with Rational Inattention
The second retirement puzzle this paper seeks to address is that people are consistently mistaken about their own Hence, multiple interpretations of these cost are possible. However at a minimum they should be understood as including the full cognitive cost of remembering and assimilating this information into future plans and should not be interpreted as just the hassle cost of finding out your SPA. As illustration, the author has paid the hassle cost of looking up his own SPA online but has not paid the cognitive cost of remembering this information and so would show up in survey data as someone with a mistaken belief and could not currently use his accurate SPA in decision making. This indicates that the full cognitive cost of remembering and assimilating information is both the minimum model and data consistent conceptualisation of these costs.
The stochastic process I will use to model the SPA is:
where e t ∈ {0, 1} and e t ∼ Bern(p)
When the SPA is below 70, the process is a random walk with a skewed innovation as e t ∈ {0, 1}. So the SPA either increases by one year with probability p in a given year or it stays the same. This process accommodates the idea that in recent history governments have reformed SPA upwards but generally not downward. This process is a parsimonious and analytically tractable model of pension reform. Although it does have some counter factual predictions, in particular, that the SPA can increase by at most one year per year whilst many individuals saw their SPA rise by multiple years in 1995, I believe it captures the essence of pension reform. The restriction to SP A t ≤ 70 was partially motivated by computational considerations but can be understood as there being some upper limit beyond which the government will not increase the SPA. It could seem unrealistic to have a model in which the small probability of the government increasing the SPA to 103 impacted on individual's decisions. Without this restriction the prior probability of SPA being greater than 70 by the time this age is reached is less than 0.02%, so this simplification should not have too large an impact whatever position is taken on the plausibility of this upper bound.
I incorporate this stochastic SPA into the model described in section 5, so the model starts with agents aged 52 but they are understood to start working life at age 20 with a SPA of 60. The agents are imperfectly informed of their SPA, which is explained in more detail below, and I make the assumption they are unable to acquire additional information before the start of the model at age 52. So they start with the posterior belief that arises from entering the workforce at age 20 believing with certainty that SPA=60 and then applying Bayesian updating in each period given the process above. Once an agent reaches their SPA their pension cannot be taken away from them. The probability p is estimated outside the model to match the actual SPAs of women born between 1950 and 1954 assuming these were generated by the process in equation 9. The probability of the SPA increasing taken from the data by this process is 6%.
A stochastic SPA alone would not explain people being mistaken about their SPA. For this I need to incorporate costly thought and this is modelled using the rational inattention approach pioneered by Sims (1998 Sims ( , 2003 . This acknowledges the costly nature of thought whilst abstracting away from psychological details. In rational inattention agents suffer a disutility cost for receiving more information as measured by the entropy of the signal they receive about the state variables.
For ease of exposition, I will use a simplified model to explain how rational attention works in my life-cycle setting, although later I introduce rational inattention into the full model described in section 5. In this simplified model the only states are the income offer y t , assets a t , and the stochastic SPA SP A t ,
s.t some constraints
In a fully rational model the agent solves for policy functions for consumption c t (a t , y t , SP A t ), leisure l t (a t , y t , SP A t ), and assets a t+1 (a t , y t , SP A t ) to solve the problem above. In the rationally inattentive model the agent is not able to directly observe the SPA but can only perceive a noisy signal of it Z t ∼ f t (z t |SP A t , a t , y t ).
She can choose the distribution of the signal and make it as precise as she likes but she receives a disutility for receiving a more precise signal proportional to the mutual information between signal and SPA I(Z t , SP A t ).
Her policy function can no longer depend on the SPA but only on her beliefs as to what her SPA is. As all agents start with the same prior belief at age 52 their belief in period t is determined by the histories of draws of Z t they have receive up to that point, z t . So now the agent chose Z t ∼ f t (z t |SP A t , a t , y t )} and policy functions c t (a t , y t , P (SP A t |z t )), l t (a t , y t , P (SP A t |z t )), and a t+1 (a t , y t , P (SP A t |z t )) to solve:
The penalty for receiving a more precise signal is proportional to the mutual information I(Z t , ERA t ) which is a concept from information theory. It measures the expected reduction in uncertainty from receiving a signal, where uncertainty is measured by entropy H(.):
Entropy is the central concept of information theory and is defined as
If the base of the logarithm is taken to be 2 then the entropy is the minimum number of bytes required to communicate the information contained in a random variable; if the logarithm is to a different base then entropy represents the same quantity but measured in a different unit. As such it is an easily understandable measure of uncertainty and the most precise measure of the amount of information received by an agent.
The introduction of rational inattention greatly complicates this model for two reasons. Firstly, it introduces a very high dimensional choice variable in f t . Since SP A t has finite support we can restrict, without loss of generality, the support of f t to be discreet and finite. In this case, f t is a finite dimensional object but is still very high dimensional having a dimension of Dim(SP A t ) − 1. Secondly, it introduces a large and unobservable state to the agents decision problem in the form of their posterior belief P (SP A t |z t ).
For these reason, solving rational inattention models is notoriously difficult. Most approaches either make a lot of simplifying assumptions, like quadratic utility (Maćkowiak, Matějka and Wiederholt, 2016), or use numerical methods that assume interior solutions (Maćkowiak and Wiederholt, 2015) . The method I use is from Steiner, Stewart, and Matȇjka (2017) (henceforth SSM) who solve a general class of dynamic discrete choice models without additional simplifying assumptions. However, as SSM's result is for a discreet choice model it requires that I discretise the choice variable. As labour choice is already discreet, this only implies a need to discretise assets. Some other minor extension and adaptations of SSM's result were required and I explain these in Appendix A.
Before outlining the results from SSM which I rely on to solve this model, it is convenient to introduce some notation. Firstly, for brevity I will denote by d t the agent's decision d t = (a t+1 , l t ) and then I will re-express the agent's utility function as a function of d t and the states, X t , by substituting out consumption via the budget constraint to give u(d t , X t ). Secondly, let W t denote the states that the agent freely and costlessly observes, that is all the states except the SPA, W t = (a t , y t , AIM E t , u t ). The principal result of SSM that I use to solve this model is that the solution of a general class of dynamic discreet choice RI problems is a dynamic logit rule (Rust, 1987 ) with a bias in form of default rule
where
for the default rule
This result differs from a standard dynamic logit only by the addition of the default rule. The default rule is the expected action at a point in the freely perceived state space W t over the part of the state space that incurs an information cost SP A t . Hence, the log q t (d t |W t ) term represents the original utility cost of information in the solution as the more information they pay to receive the more their actions will depend upon SP A t and so the larger log q t (d t |W t ). Taken to the extreme we can see that if the agent takes the same action in all eventualities of SP A t , then q t (d t |W t ) = 1 and the penalty term disappears. This is a surprising and powerful result and it is worth emphasising a couple of points about it. Firstly, the SP A t in the vector of states X t = (a t , y t , AIM E t , u t , SP A t ) is the true SPA not the agents belief or any transformation of it. The relevant states for any agent faced with this problem would contain the posterior or history of signal received replacing the SP A t (a t , y t , AIM E t , u t , z t ). SSM are able to bypass the difficulty of having this large and unobserved state by showing that the original problem is mathematically equivalent to a problem with observable states and then solve this equivalent problem. Hence, X t is a computational state vector rather than the agent's state when faced with the problem. Secondly, the logit result is not derived by introducing preference shocks as is normally the case. Instead, the logit results arises due to a deep mathematical connection between the entropy and the logit distribution which has been known and exploited since the early information theory literature (Jaynes, 1957; Shannon, 1959) .
By providing this analytic solution to rationally inattentive dynamic discreet choice models, SSM solve one of the two difficulties mentioned above: replacing the large unobserved state in the agents problem with the observed state SP A t . However, the problem of the high dimensionality of the solution remains as p t (d t |X t ) is a (|Supp(d t )| − 1) dimensional object and this implies a high computational cost as explained below.
Unlike in the traditional dynamic logit, the conditional choice probabilities now appear on both side of the equation once we substitute the definition of the default rule q t into equation 11 
Rational Inattention Results
I apply the results and methods described in the last section to solve the RI version of the model described in section 5. That is households who choose the distribution of the signal they will receive Z t ∼ f t and their actions d t given costlessly observed states and their history of signal draws to solve:
subject to the constraints and exogenous process outlined in equations 3-9.
I more than a year and in fact by this metric this value of λ is slightly to large implying 71% of people correctly know their SPA when in the data the truth is slightly less the 60%.
As can be seen in figures 5 and 6, in the aggregate profiles the most noticeable change between the RE and the RI model is an increase in asset holding and participation amongst households below the SPA. Surprisingly as the value of λ was arbitrary chosen, this has improved the fit as compared to the RE model. For comparability, the RE model presented here contains a stochastic SPA, like the RI model, but, unlike the RI model, the agent is fully informed of their own SPA. This represent an additional change to the baseline presented in section 5
beyond the discretisation needed to apply SSM. This distinction, however, is unimportant as the prediction of the RE model with and without a stochastic SPA differ only in second and third order terms so as to be almost indistinguishable. This does show that RI is crucial to the results obtained here, as introducing a stochastic SPA alone produces no describable difference.
Viewed in general terms this change in the asset profile can be understood as a response to the increased precautionary saving motive induced by RI. However the distributional details are very important. The increases in mean asset holdings is driven by two groups. One group, very wealthy outliers whose small increase in savings has a disproportionately large impact on the mean. The second group, the poor, for whom precautionary saving Neither of these groups dramatically changes their participation. The very rich do not work in either models and the poorest work in both, so the question as to what is driving the increase in participation in the RI model remains. As can be seen from figure 7, which plots the difference in probability of participation between the RE and RI model, the increased uncertainty from RI make some agents, whose labour market attachment is marginal, switch their decision. As the participation is a discrete choice this can go both ways but the dominating effect is to increase participation. Individuals with marginal participation tend to have above median assets, hence RI increases participation amongst the top half of the asset distribution.
As the RI uncertainty is resolved upon reaching SPA this might help explain the bunching of exits at SPA and repeating the regression used in section 6.2 we see that is indeed the case. In table 10, there is a much smaller reduction in the treatment effect in the RI model when we restrict to those with above median assets in the period before SPA. Although the potential for this mechanism exists with the introduction of the stochastic SPA alone, for the empirically calibrated levels of SPA uncertainty used here, the amplification of uncertainty by RI is crucial to generate any discernible difference.
An intuition for these results can be gleaned from considering the trade-off faced by the agents. Figure 8 displays in the top panel a schematic representation of the utility function of an agent at a point in the state reason for having the x-axis in these terms is to accord with the bottom pane which shows expected marginal utility next period as a function of the asset choice. This bottom pane is used to find the asset choice level that equalise today's marginal utility with the expected marginal utility next period. As the participation decision is discrete, the agent then chooses which of these two optimal decisions, conditional on working status, produces the highest utility and selects whether to work accordingly. This can be found in the top panel by comparing which intersection point is higher. I have done this for high uncertainty, representing RI in the discussion above, and low uncertainty, representing RE. As the utility function here displays prudence, marginal utilities are convex and so, by Jensen's inequality, increasing uncertainty shifts the marginal value of assets next period upwards. In this diagram we see how this increase in uncertainty can flip the participation of an agent with marginal labour market attachment. Here I show the case where they work under low uncertainty and don't under high but I could equal draw it the other way.
RI is more than the introduction of more uncertainty. It also introduces another channel for the agent to optimise over: the precision of the signal. This channel can be understood in this diagram as the ability to shift the expected marginal value of assets tomorrow down by reducing the uncertainty but only at the cost of One interesting result is that, except at a handful of points, agents choose to receive very little information and these points tend to be found in the upper half of the asset distribution. This prediction agrees with a finding by Rohwedder and Kleinjans (2006) that richer people are more likely informed of their social security provision.
Extension
So far this work has ignored the third retirement puzzle identified: that people do not take up more than actuarially fair option to defer pension receipt. However, rational inattention can speak very directly to this puzzle. The calculation implying actuarial favourable deferral ignore the attention cost of an uncertain future pension entitlement, which benefit claiming convert into certain and salient present income.
The version of the model presented in section 6, does not incorporate such a mechanism for two reason.
Firstly, the model does not include a benefit claiming decision. Secondly, the only source of uncertainty subject to an attention cost is the SPA and once this age is reached the attention cost disappears whether the agent claims or not. Including more sources of uncertainty subject to an attention cost would make the model more realistic. If one of these additional source were uncertainty concerning the level of the state pension and a benefit claiming decision were added, then the model would include an additional incentive not to defer resulting from cognitive costs. As long as current income is still treated as salient claiming removes the attention cost related to the level of state pension by converting uncertainty future pension benefits into certain current income. Hence providing an incentive not to defer which is ignored in the claims that deferral is more than actuarially fair. The level of uncertainty in pension benefits could be estimated directly from the data outside the model as was done in section 6 for the SPA.
Conclusion
This working paper offers a solution to three puzzles in the retirement literature by incorporating rational inattention into a quantitative retirement saving model. In doing so it makes contributions beyond offering a solution to these three puzzles. Firstly, it adds to the evidence for the first puzzle that retirement choices are more sensitive to legislated pension ages than rational expectations can account for. It does this in the context of the UK female state pension age reform by more carefully controlling for assets and by demonstrating that a state-of-the-art RE model fails to match the observed treatment effect for individuals across the distribution of assets: it exaggerates the impact of the SPA on poorer individuals whilst underestimating the impact on wealthier agents. Secondly, the paper contributes to the rational inattention literature by being the first, to the best of my knowledge, not only to incorporate rational inattention into a life-cycle model but also to assess a rationally inattentive model against non-experimental individual choice data. Doing this allows the lifecycle model to accommodate the second puzzle: that people hold mistaken beliefs about their own provisions for retirement. Results from the RI model are preliminary but they offer some insight into the dynamics RI introduces and indicate that RI has the potential to illuminate bunching of labour market exits at SPA as well as people's ignorance of their pension provision. The key mechanism behind this result is that by allowing for uncertainty in the SPA, resolved upon reaching SPA, introduces additional precautionary saving; thus, inducing greater labour market participation pre-SPA. Crucially, introducing reasonable levels of uncertainty about the SPA without RI only negligible increases the sensitivity of labour force participation to the SPA. It is the differential and endogenous amplification of this uncertainty by rational inattention that allows the model to better match the sensitivity of labour market choices to the SPA across the wealth distribution. The approach taken to discipline the cost of attention introduced in the RI model is to use subjective expectations data and, to the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to use the techniques of subjective expectations literature to discipline attention costs in a rational inattentive model. Finally, the paper propose an extension of the main model with a mechanism to explain the third puzzle for a rational expectations explanation of retirement: that people do not take up more that actuarially advantageous deferral options. The insight offer by this extension is that assertions that deferral is actuarially advantageous omit attention cost which can be avoid by claiming, hence omit an incentive not to defer.
But then |B| ≤ |X| < ∞ ⇒ b t is measurable wrt x t and hence E[H(θ t |b t , y t+1 )] ≥ E[H(θ t |x t , y t+1 )] and E[H(y t+1 |b t , y t )] ≥ E[H(y t+1 |x t , y t )] and therefore 15≥14 .
Step 3: As B ⊂ X if p is a probability choice rule then f t (x t |w t ) = p t (b t |ω t ) and x t = σ t (z t−1 , x t ) is a viable solution to 14. For this strategy generated by this mapping, the probability choice rule makes equation15=equation14
Step 4: If s solves 14 the corresponding PCR p must solve 15, as by step 2 the value from p in 15≥s in 14, so if p doesn't solve 15 ∃ PCR producing greater net lifetime utiltiy than s in 14. But by step 3 this produces a viable solution to 14 with greater net life-time utility contradicting s being a solution to 14.
Step 5: If p solve 15 then by step 3 it produces a viable solution to 14 but then 15≥14 so this strategy must be the optimal solution to 14
The remainder of the proof follow as stated in SSM for the case where the choice variables are discrete as is the case in this paper.
It is worth saying a few words about how the model in this paper maps to the class of models in this appendix based on SSM as the correspondence is not obvious. The clearest difference between the SSM setup and the model presented in section 6 is that SSM only allow for exogenous states whilst I have an endogenous state in the form of assets a t . However, since utility can depend upon the entire history of choices and states there is a simple mapping from the endogenous states without history dependent preferences to the world of exogenous states with history dependent preferences. The state in the sense of SSM now only contains the exogenous states Θ t = Supp(SP A) × Supp(Y t ) × Supp(AIM E t ), (SP A t , y t , u t ) = θ t ∈ Θ t but since a t ∈ d t−1
and AIM E t = g(d t−1 , θ t−1 ) for the function g that follows from the definition of AIM E t given in section 5.
Hence, we can re-express the the utility given in terms of section 6 states X t and the current decision u(d t , X t )
in terms of the history of exogenous state θ t and the history of decisions u(d t , θ t ). And since the SSM agent condition their action on everything useful from z t−1 = (d t−1 , y t ), they can condition on all states.
